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Abstract
Since the introduction in Georgia in 2007 of an African swine fever (ASF) genotype 2 
virus strain, the virus has rapidly spread to both Western European and Asian coun-
tries. It now constitutes a major threat for the global swine industry. The ongoing 
European transmission cycle has been related to the ‘wild boar habitat’ with closed 
transmission events between wild boar populations and incidental spillovers to com-
mercial and non- commercial (backyard) pig holdings. During the epidemic in Belgium, 
only wild boar were infected and although the introduction route has not yet been 
elucidated, the ‘human factor’ is highly suspected. While ASF was successfully con-
tained in a small region in the Southern part of Belgium without affecting domestic 
pigs, the risk of spillover at the wild/domestic interface remains poorly assessed. In 
this study, we used a semi- quantitative method, involving national and international 
experts, to assess the risk associated with different transmission routes for ASF in-
troduction from wild boar to domestic pig holdings and subsequent dissemination 
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1  | INTRODUC TION
African swine fever (ASF) is a viral disease (caused by ASF virus of 
the family Asfarviridae) notifiable to the EU and the OIE (Alonso 
et al., 2018; OIE, 2019). ASF only affects Suidae, in particular do-
mestic pigs (Sus scrofa domesticus) and wild boar (Sus scrofa). In 2007, 
ASF was introduced to Georgia, probably from the Eastern part 
of Africa or Madagascar via contaminated food used to feed pigs 
(Blome et al., 2020) (EFSA, 2020). An early isolate, Georgia 2007/01, 
was genetically related to the genotype II of ASF viruses (Rowlands 
et al., 2008). It then spread quickly to neighbouring countries, from 
Russia to the Baltic countries (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia) and Poland, 
and further towards Western Europe. Currently, many Eastern 
European countries have reported high numbers of infected domes-
tic pigs and/or wild boar, both as single outbreak or multiple local-
ized outbreaks (Belarus, Moldavia, Ukraine, Poland, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia) (EFSA, 2020). 
The virus has been recently detected in Western Europe as well, 
in Belgium in 2018 (Garigliany et al., 2019; Gilliaux et al., 2019; 
Linden et al., 2019; Saegerman et al., 2018) and more recently in 
2020 in Germany at the border with Poland (OIE, 2020; Sauter- Louis 
et al., 2020)). Simultaneously, the virus spread eastwards through 
Russia to reach mainland China and now numerous other Asian 
countries. Thereby, ASF has become a major global threat for the 
swine industry.
The ASF virus infects its host mainly through the oronasal route 
and is very resistant in the environment, especially when associ-
ated with biological material (blood, meat, cadavers, faeces) (Blome 
et al., 2020; Guinat et al., 2016; Sánchez- Vizcaíno et al., 2012). Many 
potential transmission routes allow the virus to be transmitted 
from an infected animal to a healthy one. They are of both direct 
(via infected animals, their excretions and their cadavers) and indi-
rect nature (via animate or non- animate vectors such as mechanical 
carriage of the virus by humans, contaminated clothing or equip-
ment) (Costard, Mur et al., 2013; Guinat et al., 2016; Sánchez- 
Vizcaíno et al., 2012). Soft ticks (Ornithodoros porcinus moubata 
and Ornithodoros marocanus) are involved in transmission cycles in 
Africa and have been involved in an outbreak in the Iberian peninsula 
(Portugal and Spain) in the 1960’s (Sánchez- Vizcaíno et al., 2015). 
More recently, haematophagous flies have been also proposed as 
non- multiplying vectors for mechanical transmission of the ASF 
virus between porcine hosts (Olesen, Hansen et al., 2018; Olesen, 
Lohse et al., 2018; Fila & Woźniakowski, 2020; Olesen et al., 2020; 
Saegerman et al., 2020; Vergne et al., 2020).
The spread of ASF in wildlife (wild boar) has shown different 
transmission patterns across Europe. The most frequent pattern is 
associated with transmission events between wild boar populations. 
These lead sometimes to spillover events to domestic pigs, usually 
held ‘outdoor’ and on ‘non- commercial’ farms, also known as ‘back-
yard’ farms (Jurado et al., 2018). The sustained circulation of the ASF 
virus within wild boar population is a fully novel ‘wild boar– habitat’ 
transmission cycle where direct or indirect contacts (through cadav-
ers of infected wild boars or leftovers from it) can sustain the infec-
tions (Chenais et al., 2018). Occasionally, ASF ‘makes a jump’ from an 
endemic area to a more distant area, that is ASF suddenly appears in 
new areas far away from endemic zones for which the spread can-
not be explained by wild boar contacts. These introduction events 
have been suspected to be related to human mediated spread (the 
so- called ‘human factor’) through the import of infectious animals 
or material in naïve areas (EFSA, 2020). At least three representa-
tive examples of such suspected human- mediated introductions can 
be listed: introduction into wildlife in the Czech Republic in 2017, in 
wildlife in Belgium in 2018 and more recently in 2020 in wildlife in 
Western Poland (EFSA, 2020) (OIE, 2020).
In 2014, Roelandt and collaborators assessed the overall risk 
of ASF entry in Belgium as ‘low’ (Roelandt et al., 2017). This was 
between holdings in the Belgian epidemiological context. Qualitative responses ob-
tained by our questionnaire were numerically transformed and statistically processed 
to provide a semi- quantitative assessment of the occurrence of the hazard and a 
ranking of all transmission routes. ‘Farmer’, ‘bedding material’, ‘veterinarian’ and ‘pro-
fessionals from the pig sector’ were considered as the most important transmission 
routes for ASF introduction from the wild reservoir to pig holdings. ‘Animal move-
ments’, ‘farmer’, ‘veterinarian’, ‘iatrogenic’, ‘animal transport truck’ and ‘animal care 
equipment’ were considered as the most important transmission routes posing a risk 
of ASF spread between pig holdings. Combined with specific biosecurity checks in 
the holdings, this assessment helps in prioritizing risk mitigation measures against 
ASF introduction and further spread in the domestic pig industry, particularly while 
the ASF situation in Western Europe is worsening.
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based on the probability of introduction estimated to be ‘low’ and 
the consequences estimated to be high’. They pointed out the 
potential introduction risks (and uncertainties) through illegal im-
portation of local meat products through the eastern European 
seasonal workforce in Belgium, through hunting tourism and 
through wild boar. In September 2018, wild boar from a small 
area in the south of Belgium were confirmed as infected by ASF 
(Linden et al., 2019). Huge efforts (i.e. regionalization, hunt, traps, 
fences, search and removal of cadavers) have been carried out by 
the Regional authorities for containment and eradication of the 
outbreak. At the same time, Belgian federal authorities (Federal 
Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain, FASFC) increased the 
level of awareness and vigilance in the domestic pig sector to 
early detect any spillover event from the wild reservoir. In early 
September 2018 after the first cases, two zones, zone I (or buffer 
zone) and zone II (or contaminated zone), were defined according 
to the European regulation concerning ASF. A temporary stand 
still was imposed on the entire Belgian pig industry and a stamp-
ing out of pig holdings localized within the contaminated zone 
(where infected wild boar were present) was quickly carried out. 
As this zone was later further extended following the discovery 
of infected wild boar outside, preventive culling was no longer 
carried out systematically but replaced by a systematic biosecu-
rity assessment of the newly included farms by the FASFC. Up to 
late August 2019, infected live wild boar and cadavers at various 
stages of decomposition were removed from the contaminated 
zone and tested. Since August 2019, only bones giving positive 
result by PCR (but without residual infectivity in cell culture assay 
– B. Cay (personal communication) have been discovered, the last 
one being discovered in March 2020. Presently, Belgium has re-
covered its status as ‘officially free from ASF’ according to the 
OIE’s conditions.
The Scientific Committee established at the FASFC delivered 
from October 2018 to June 2020 ten opinions to scientifically sup-
port Belgian authorities in their efforts to manage the disease. One 
of these opinions (SciCom, 2020) aimed to provide the risk managers 
with a semi- quantitative assessment of the putative risk transmis-
sion routes for introduction of ASF from wildlife to the domestic pig 
sector in the particular situation of Belgium. This opinion was based 
on statistical analysis of the responses delivered by 34 national and 
international experts in veterinary virology, veterinary epidemiol-
ogy, domestic pig industry, wildlife and wildlife disease management, 
to a survey on transmission routes for ASF introduction from the 
wild reservoir to the domestic pig sector giving the particular condi-
tions of the Belgian epidemiological context.
2  | MATERIAL AND METHODS
The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) defines a risk as 
the likelihood of the occurrence and the likely magnitude of the bio-
logical and economic consequences of an adverse event or effect to 
animal or human health (Dufour et al., 2011). In this study, biological 
and economic consequences for occurrence of the hazard (ASF in-
troduction in the Belgian pig industry) were not considered as they 
are well known and particularly heavy (direct losses plus indirect 
impact linked to the loss of the ‘officially free from ASF in Suidae’ 
status for the country and all economic consequences on trades). 
These severe consequences are unavoidably increasing the level of 
the final qualitative risk which can be assessed from any transmis-
sion routes or risk pathways of any hazard, even if its probability of 
occurrence can be assessed as relatively low. Instead, a list of vari-
ous transmissions routes for ASF introduction at the wild/domestic 
interface and those for further spread between pig holdings was 
provided to an expert panel, in order to assess the likelihood of oc-
currence of the risk. Individual scores for occurrence of the hazard 
were thereof obtained.
2.1 | Putative transmission routes
Twenty- five transmission routes that could lead to ASF introduction 
from wildlife into a pig holding were identified by expert opinion 
(n = 15 experts; all co- authors except X. Van Huffel) and based on 
literature data (Bellini et al., 2021; Costard, Mur et al., 2013; Guinat 
et al., 2016; Sánchez- Vizcaíno et al., 2012). The following transmis-
sion routes were considered for the risk of ASF introduction into a 
pig holding:
• those related to infected wild boar living in an area of the country 
(n = 2 routes): infected living wild boar (‘living wild boar’), infected 
wild boar cadaver/trophies from an infected wild boar (‘wild boar 
cadaver/trophies, the later relates to some pieces from the wild 
boar that hunters can bring back at home’);
• those which are human- related (n = 8 routes), if these people 
were involved with activities within the regulated zone: ‘farmer’ 
(the operator in a pig holding), ‘veterinarian’ (any practitioner in-
volved in a pig holding), ‘hunter’, ‘fisherman’, ‘hiker’ (people walk-
ing around in the contaminated zone where infected wild boar 
reside, ‘crop/forest worker’ (people working inside the contami-
nated zone), ‘professional from the pig sector’, ‘non- professional 
visitor’ (of a pig holding who has been staying in a contaminated 
area);
• those related to material for animal care (n = 2): ‘farm vehicle/
feeding equipment’, ‘bedding material’;
• those related to ‘arthropods’ (n = 1) i.e. ticks, haematophagous or 
other insects and flies, maggots;
• those related to animals other than wild boar (n = 8): ‘rodents’, 
‘hunting dog’, ‘farm dog’, ‘ruminant’, ‘horse’, ‘bird’, ‘cat’, ‘wild ani-
mals’ (other than wild boar);
• those related to feed for pigs (n = 2): ‘swill feeding’, ‘contaminated 
vegetal products’ (as used as feed, i.e. cereals, grass, soy);
• those related to water (n = 2): ‘well water’, ‘river water’.
Twenty- five transmission routes that could facilitate the fur-
ther spread of ASF between pig holdings following any introduction 
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event were identified by the same expert group. The following trans-
mission routes were considered for the risk of ASF spread between 
pig holdings (EFSA, 2014):
• those related to an infected pig (n = 5): ‘animal movements’, ‘air-
borne’, ‘animal by- products’ (in particular manure), ‘blood prod-
ucts’ of swine origin, ‘embryo/sperm/oocysts’;
• those which are human- related (n = 5), when people are involved 
in activities within the holding: ‘farmer’, ‘veterinarian’ (any prac-
titioner involved in pig holding), ‘controller for authority’ (federal 
and regional agents in charge for the controls carried out in hold-
ings for compliance with regulations), ‘professional from the pig 
sector’ (who can be in close contacts with pigs as animal trader, 
butcher, slaughter employee, feed trader, holding employee, etc.), 
‘non- professional visitor’ (of the holding);
• those which are vehicle- related (n = 5): ‘feed truck’, ‘animal trans-
port truck’, ‘rendering truck’, ‘manure transport truck’, ‘insemina-
tor's vehicle’ (i.e. boar semen delivery vehicle);
• those related to material (n = 4): ‘iatrogenic’ (syringe, needles), ‘an-
imal care equipment’, ‘feeding equipment’, ‘bedding material’;
• those which are pest- related (n = 2): ‘haematophagous arthro-
pods’ (flies, ticks, other), ‘rodents’;
• those which are animal- related (n = 4) (other than pigs and if in 
contact with the ASF virus in the infected holding): ‘dog’, ‘cat’, ‘ru-
minant’, ‘bird’.
2.2 | Questionnaire and elicited experts
A questionnaire, listing the transmission routes to be assessed by 
the experts was developed in excel (Data S1). The questionnaire 
was prepared and validated by all the co- authors of this study (all 
members of the working group of the Scientific Committee estab-
lished at the FASFC on ASF) in order to fulfil usual consideration 
in expert elicitation (details on the assessment, description of the 
Belgian context for ASF, use of the form and scoring scheme expla-
nation) before sending. This was send by mail to a group of European 
experts (n = 77) together with the instructions on how to fill the 
questionnaire. Both national and international experts were identi-
fied by the authors They were proposed based upon their expertise 
on epidemiology and/or virology of ASF and other infectious pig dis-
eases as well as expertise on wildlife and wildlife management. All 
the co- authors except the first author of this study also filled in the 
questionnaire. Data S2 gives the name, origin and field of expertise 
of each expert. Each expert was asked to qualitatively assess each 
transmission route on the following three criteria: (a) the likelihood 
of contamination by ASF, (b) the likelihood of transmission of ASF to 
domestic pigs, (c) the frequency of contact between domestic pigs 
and the transmission route. Every criterion had to be ranked on a 6- 
rank scale (range: ‘negligible’, ‘very low’, ‘low’, ‘medium’, ‘high’, ‘very 
high’). Each qualitative value was further explained in the question-
naire in order to help to the standardization and the assessors to 
perceive this 6- rank scale. Furthermore, the experts were asked to 
assess the level of uncertainty associated to each response (range: 
‘low’, ‘medium’, ‘high’) as well as their level of expertise (range: ‘negli-
gible’, ‘very low’, ‘low’, ‘medium’, ‘high’, ‘very high’) in their respective 
fields (e.g. veterinary virology, veterinary epidemiology, pig industry, 
wildlife disease and management), and their knowledge on the par-
ticular Belgian ASF epidemiological context (range: ‘negligible’, ‘very 
low’, ‘low’, ‘medium’, ‘high’, ‘very high’). It was clearly specified that 
the assessment must be filled in keeping in mind the particular epi-
demiological context of Belgium for ASF (that was further detailed 
in the form). It was assumed and specified to the experts that all the 
transmission routes for the virus must be considered as infected/
contaminated and/or originating or having circulated in the contami-
nated zone delimitated in Belgium in compliance with the region-
alization within the European regulation (zones I and II). Regarding 
all transmission routes for ASF spreading, it was specified that they 
must be assessed before any primary detection of virus circulation, 
i.e. before any mitigation measure or actions are put in force.
2.3 | Statistics
All statistical analyses were carried out using R and Statistica. In 
order to perform the analyses, the qualitative responses were first 
transformed into numerical values, that is ‘negligible’ = 0, ‘very 
low’ = 1, ‘low’ = 2, ‘medium’ = 3, ‘high’ = 4, ‘very high’ = 5 for each 
criteria and ‘low’ = 1, ‘medium’ = 2, high’ = 3 for uncertainty on. The 
numerical value ‘0’ was given to the qualitative assessment ‘negli-
gible’ as it was reflecting a level considered as sufficiently low to 
be ignored and allowing numerical transformation relying on equi-
distance between each of the nominal value (Likert scale). For each 
transmission route, an overall score for occurrence of the hazard was 
calculated by multiplying the individual scores for each of the three 
corresponding criteria's (i.e. likelihood of contamination by ASF, like-
lihood of transmission of ASF to domestic pigs, frequency of contact 
between domestic pigs and the transmission route). Finally, the dif-
ferent transmission routes were ranked for both ASF introduction 
and ASF spread, based on their median overall scores. Furthermore, 
an overall score of uncertainty around the responses was included, 
by adding individual scores for uncertainty on each assessed crite-
rion and calculating the median thereof.
2.4 | Sensitivity analysis
A sensitivity analysis was performed according to the same meth-
odology developed by Saegerman et al., (2020) to analyse the 
robustness of the expert elicitation and the putative influence 
of each criteria in the ranking of transmission routes for both in-
troduction and spread of ASF. Briefly, a ranking of transmission 
routes, considering all criteria, that is the probability of contami-
nation by ASF, the probability of transmission of ASF to domestic 
pigs as well as the frequency of contact, was first established as 
reference and using the median value of the overall score. One 
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criterion (one by one) was then ignored, and all transmission routes 
were subsequently ranked using the same methodology as pre-
sented before. For each transmission route, modifications in the 
ranking were counted, only considering changes of more than 
three ranks. A diagram was created to visualize any modification 
of rank induced by the withdrawal of a given criterion of transmis-
sion routes. In the same way, the robustness of expert elicitation 
was tested using the same methodology (removal of all national or 
international experts, and by the removal of 14 experts randomly 
selected permitting the artificial constitution of 10 panels of 20 
F I G U R E  1   a. Ranking on decreasing median overall scores of the 25 transmission routes identified for the risk of ASF introduction into 
pig holdings. Median overall score is the median obtained on overall scores as assessed by 34 experts(overall score for each transmission 
route and for each expert was obtained by multiplication of the individual scores on three criteria, that is the likelihood of contamination by 
ASF, the likelihood of transmission of ASF to domestic pigs and the frequency of contact between domestic pigs and the transmission route). 
The median level of uncertainty is given following a colour code. Median level of uncertainty was obtained in a similar way than for the 
median overall score but by addition of the individual score of uncertainty on each criterion. b. Risk groups for the introduction of African 
swine fever into pig holdings, obtained following regression tree analysis. The groups range from 1 to 4, from the group with the highest 
score for occurrence of hazard (group 1) to the lowest risk (group 4). The overall scores for occurrence of hazard were transformed to risk 
scores, and the transmission routes were ranked according to their median score (dot within the box) for occurrence of hazard reported as 
a proportion (0 to 1 on X- axis). The median score of uncertainty was scaled from 1 to 3 and represented in the figure with asterisks: low (*), 
medium (**), high (***) uncertainty. $: median value of risk score
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experts in order to test the influence of the composition of ex-
pert field expertise). Further sensitivity analyses were carried out 
by making the transmission routes depending on the origin of the 
experts (national or international) and on their level of expertise in 
the different field of expertise.
2.5 | Regression tree analysis
The objective of the regression tree analysis was to attribute each 
transmission route of ASF into a homogenous group, that is each 
group of routes of ASF transmission is statistically different from 
F I G U R E  2   a. Ranking on decreasing median overall scores of the 23 transmission routes identified for the risk of ASF spread between pig 
holdings. Median overall score is the median obtained on overall scores as assessed by 34 experts (overall score for each transmission route 
and for each expert was obtained by the multiplication of the individual scores on three criteria, that is the likelihood of contamination by 
ASF, the likelihood of transmission of ASF to domestic pigs, the frequency of contact between domestic pigs and the transmission route). 
The median level of uncertainty is given following a colour code. Median level of uncertainty was obtained in a similar way than for the 
median overall score but by addition of the individual score of uncertainty on each criterion. b. Risk groups for the spread of African swine 
fever between pig holdings, obtained following regression tree analysis. The groups range from 1 to 3, from the group with the highest 
score for occurrence of hazard (group 1) to the lowest risk (group 3). The overall scores for occurrence of hazard were transformed to risk 
scores, and the transmission routes were ranked according to their median score (dot within the box) for occurrence of hazard reported as 
a proportion (0– 1 on X- axis). The median score of uncertainty was scaled from 1 to 3 and represented in the figure with asterisks: low (*), 
medium (**), high (***) uncertainty. $: median value of risk score
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another group. For this regression tree analysis each overall score 
for each transmission route was transformed in proportions (over-
all score divided by the maximal score to obtain the ‘risk score’). 
Transmission routes of ASF were grouped in a terminal node, which 
was characterized by an average overall score with the smallest 
standard deviation as possible. The regression tree analysis was 
carried out using Salford Predictive Modeller (Salford Systems, San 
Diego, USA) (for further details, see Saegerman et al., 2020).
3  | Result s
Thirty- four responses were received (n = 20 for national expert; 
n = 14 for international experts; response rate of about 44%; de-
tails of the respondents are given in Data S2). The level of exper-
tise reached by the panel in the different relevant fields of expertise 
(virology, epidemiology, pig production sector, wildlife diseases and 
management, knowledge of the Belgian epidemiological context for 
ASF) is given in Data S3. Their median level of expertise in epidemi-
ology, pig production sector and knowledge of the Belgian epide-
miological context for ASF was self- assessed as ‘high’ by the expert 
panel. Their median level of expertise in virology and wildlife dis-
eases and management were self- assessed as ‘moderate’ and ‘low to 
moderate’, respectively. Data S4 summarized the results for as both 
barplots and boxplots which were inferred from all the assessment 
for each transmission route (ASF introduction into a pig holding or 
spread between pig holdings).
The ranking of the transmission routes which was inferred from 
the assessments is given in Figure 1a. By means of regression tree 
analysis, four groups could be distinguished according to their rel-
evance for ASF introduction into a pig holding from in the Belgian 
wild reservoir in the regulated zone (Figure 1b), as to know: (a) group 
1 (risk score of 0.3 ± 0.061): ‘farmer’, ‘bedding material’, ‘veterinar-
ian’ and ‘professionals from the pig sector’; (b) group 2 (risk score 
of 0.132 ± 0.028): ‘swill feeding’, ‘farm vehicles/feeding equipment’, 
‘contaminated vegetal products’, ‘hunter’, ‘living wild boar’, ‘farm 
dog’, ‘rodents’ and ‘bird’; (c) group 3 (risk score of 0.058 ± 0.008): 
‘hunting dog’, ‘well water’, ‘cat’, ‘haematophagous arthropods’ and 
‘river water’; (d) group 4 (risk score of 0.025 ± 0.013): ‘culture/forest 
worker’, ‘wild boar cadaver/trophies’, ‘wild animal other than wild 
boar’, ‘hiker’, fisherman’, ‘non- professional visitor’, ‘ruminant’ and 
‘horse’.
A ranking was also inferred in regard to ASF spread between 
pig holdings following any introduction (Figure 2a). Regression tree 
analysis has identified three groups according to their relevance for 
ASF spread between pig holdings (Figure 2b) (a) group 1 (risk score 
of 0.468 ± 0.097): ‘animal movements, ‘farmer’, ‘veterinarian’, ‘iat-
rogenic’, ‘animal transport truck’ and ‘animal care equipment’; (b) 
group 2 (risk score of 0.205 ± 0.043): ‘professional from the pig 
sector’, ‘controller for authority’, ‘haematophagous arthropods’, 
‘animal by- products’, ‘rendering truck’, ‘embryo/sperm/oocysts’, 
‘swine blood products’ and ‘manure transport’; (c) group 3 (risk score 
of 0.071 ± 0.031): ‘rodents’, ‘feed truck’, ‘non- professional visitor’, 
‘inseminator vehicle’ (boar semen delivery vehicle), ‘dog’, ‘cat’, ‘bird’, 
‘airborne’ and ‘ruminant’.
Although the transmission routes ‘feeding equipment’ and ‘bed-
ding material’ were submitted for expert assessment as they are usu-
ally considered as putative transmission route in the literature, these 
were subsequently excluded from the analysis of the results. The 
reason was that lending ‘feeding equipment’ is a very uncommon 
practice in the majority of commercial Belgian pig holdings. Similarly, 
‘bedding material’ is no longer available for other holdings after use. 
Instead, the contaminated litter was assessed via the 'manure trans-
port' and animal by- products (manure) transmission routes.
The sensitivity analysis on the criteria for ASF transmission 
routes of introduction and spread indicated that all the three crite-
ria are useful as the removal of each one influenced the ranking of 
routes of ASF transmission and especially for the ASF introduction 
(important changes in the top five ranked routes) (Figure 3 and Data 
S5). In addition, the sensitivity analysis on experts permitted to as-
sess the robustness of this elicitation (Figure 4a and b, and Data S6). 
Also, for ASF introduction, there is an important influence of the 
panel choice (field of expertise; Data S7) but not in extremities of 
the ranking. However, little influence was observed in the ranking of 
ASF spread routes as well as after removing all national or interna-
tional experts. This influence had also less effect, which underlines 
the need to have a sufficient number of experts with varying exper-
tise in the panel (Figure 4c and d).
4  | DISCUSSION
ASF endemicity in several European wild boar populations is a real 
threat for the pig industry due to the risk of spillover to commer-
cial or non- commercial (backyard) holdings. In the environment, 
ASF can remain infectious for a long time in wild boar cadavers or 
leftovers. Some cases of spillover to domestic pigs have been sus-
pected to be related to this virus persistence (EFSA, 2014). Various 
transmission routes must be considered for ASF introduction at the 
wild- domestic pig interface, involving multiple risk pathways. In this 
study, a semi- quantitative assessment and a ranking of both the risk 
of introduction and further spread in the Belgian epidemiological 
context is provided. To correctly consider these rankings, sensitiv-
ity analyses were carried out in order to discriminate between the 
effect of the expertise level of the elicited experts in five relevant 
fields of expertise, as well as on their origin (national versus inter-
national). Moreover, this assessment took into account the level of 
uncertainty on the responses. By splitting the semi- quantitative as-
sessment of the transmission routes on its three criteria (likelihood 
of contamination, likelihood of transmission and frequency of con-
tacts with pigs), this study is providing useful information for the 
development of tailor- made mitigation strategies in countries facing 
ASF circulation in the wildlife reservoir and coping with the risk of 
ASF introduction and spread to their domestic pig sector.
Different studies looked at the transmission routes for ASF in-
troduction in the pig industry and/or spread between pig holdings. 
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Roelandt and collaborators provide an interesting study about possi-
bilities for ASF introduction in Belgium in 2014, that is 4 years before 
its introduction in Belgian wild boar (Roelandt et al., 2017). In their 
study, entry was considered as a whole and all the putative trans-
mission routes were not spread for particular assessment. However, 
elicited experts did point out potential introduction risks through the 
local wildlife (Roelandt et al., 2017). At the very beginning of the ASF 
outbreak in Eastern Europe, Mur and collaborators provide a quan-
titative risk assessment of ASF entry in European countries through 
legal import of pigs (Mur et al., 2012). Many similar studies assessed 
a direct introduction of ASF infected pigs into the local pig industry 
(Costard, Jones et al., 2013; Mur et al., 2012), rarely looking at in-
termediary stages in a wildlife reservoir (Cho et al., 2020; Costard, 
Jones et al., 2013; Herrera- Ibatá et al., 2017; Ito et al., 2020; Mur 
et al., 2012; Sugiura & Haga, 2018). Yet, considering the current 
European outbreak, a recent study has demonstrated that ASF cases 
in domestic pigs and wild boars were spatially correlated in the north 
west areas of Russia (Vergne et al., 2017). In the specific context of 
the Belgian outbreak, ASF was already introduced and spread to a 
susceptible wildlife reservoir which was spatially segregated from 
the main area of the pig industry. Up to date, only two countries 
successfully coped with a similar situation during the European out-
break and recovered their status as ‘officially free from ASF’ accord-
ing to the OIE’s conditions without experiencing any introduction 
into their domestic pig sector, namely Czech Republic and Belgium.
By means of an expert elicitation, we highlighted four important 
groups of transmission routes in the risk of ASF transmission from 
wild boar to pig holdings. The most important routes (group 1) were 
farmers, bedding material, veterinary practitioners and profession-
als in the pig sector. The assessment of these four routes showed 
a lower uncertainty compared with the assessment of most of the 
other routes, which further reinforces their relative importance. This 
F I G U R E  3   Modification in the 
rank of routes of ASF transmission via 
sensitivity analysis on criteria, both for 
introduction [a] and spread [b]. All: all 
criteria; All- contam: All criteria minus 
likelihood of contamination by ASF; All- 
trans: all criteria minus the likelihood of 
transmission of ASF to domestic pigs; All- 
contact: all criteria minus the frequency of 
contact with domestic pigs; X: more than 
three ranks of difference in the ranking 
between the particular situation and the 
situation where all criteria were taken into 
account
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reflects that, in the Belgian epidemiological context (i.e. a few hold-
ings with outdoor access, professionalized operators, a very strict 
regulatory framework, a strong regionalization of pig and wild boar 
population densities), indirect transmission through (human- related) 
mechanical vectors of the virus can play a higher role than direct con-
tacts with infected wild boar. This highlights the role of the so- called 
‘human factor’ in the epidemiology of the disease (Zani et al., 2019). 
However, direct contacts must be especially considered in case of 
outdoor access. In the Belgian context, very few pig holdings were 
still currently active within the regulated zones in Belgium and they 
were all closed. Bedding material as well as vegetal products used 
for feed may constitute one of the most controversial routes, espe-
cially since national and international experts had diverging opinion 
on these factors.
Scientific data on the persistence of the virus on vegetal prod-
ucts in field conditions and on representative matrices are scarce 
in comparison with the putative frequency of contacts pigs can 
have with (i.e. when used as feed) and the efficiency of these routes 
(Niederwerder et al., 2019; Stoian et al., 2020). These materials 
deserve attention and more representative experimental studies, 
especially for feed, are needed. Fischer and collaborators recently 
showed that the risk of ASFV transmission via contaminated crops 
is most likely low if they are incubated for at least 2 hr at room tem-
perature (Fischer et al., 2020). Nonetheless, the EU commission rec-
ommends the storage for 1 month of any grains or grass used for 
feed and the ban of straw used for bedding for 3 months (unless 
these are specifically treated to inactivate ASF virus) to minimize the 
risk of transmission as much as possible. In contrast, even if bed-
ding material was already suspected to be involved in ASF transmis-
sion in some European countries (Nurmoja et al., 2018; Oļševskis 
et al., 2016), this was less expected to play an important role as the 
use of straw as bedding material is a rare practice in most of the 
(closed) commercial pig holdings.
The high rank attributed to swill feeding can be surprising in 
the Belgian context, as this practice is forbidden by regulation 
since the previous incursion of African swine fever in Belgium in 
1985 was due to this transmission route (pigs were fed with con-
taminated pig meat from the Iberian peninsula where the virus 
was circulating; Biront et al, 1987). Swill feeding is also forbid-
den by European regulation (Regulation (EC) n°1069/2009 of the 
European Parliament and the Council of 21 October 2009 laying 
down health rules regarding animal by- products and derived prod-
ucts not intended for human consumption). This route is known 
to be very efficient for ASF transmission between domestic pigs 
given the resistance of the virus, particularly in meat. On one 
hand, experts scored very high both the likelihood of contamina-
tion (median score = 4, medium uncertainty) and the transmission 
(median score = 5, medium uncertainty) of swill feeding if it was 
containing contaminated meat. On the other hand, the frequency 
of contact with pigs was rated much lower (median score = 1, low 
F I G U R E  4   Modification in the rank of ASF transmission routes via sensitivity analysis on the origin of experts and on the expert panel, 
both for introduction [a] and [c] and spread [b] and [d], respectively. All: expert from national and international origin; Nat only: only expert 
from national origin; Int only: only experts from international origin; P: ten random panels with different composition of field expertise. X: 
more than three ranks of difference in the ranking between the particular situation and the situation with all experts
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uncertainty) due to regulation constraints. However, the relative 
importance of the risk associated with swill feeding, for example 
fraudulent consignments of contaminated meat from other con-
taminated areas, poaching of potentially infected Belgian wild 
boar should be reminded to all operators, especially hobbyists and 
petting zoos or those with less experience in the pig sector. It must 
be highlighted that ranking for swill feeding diverged between 
Belgian (national) and non- Belgian (international) experts (Data 
S6). The fact that swill feeding obtained the highest ranking ac-
cording to international experts can probably be explained by the 
fact that swill feeding has long been shown as a common and his-
torically important transmission route for ASF and forgetting the 
specific structure of the pig industry in Belgium for which ‘back-
yard’ holdings are rare (as usually this factor is more frequently 
associated with swill feeding practice; (Boklund et al., 2020)).
The risk of ASF introduction via leisure activities or forest work 
was low ranked by experts. While these activities might not have 
a significant impact on the risk of ASF introduction into pig hold-
ings, they could be important to affect ASF spread in wildlife (Petit 
et al., 2019). It should be noted that most of the low ranked transmis-
sion routes were associated with a high uncertainty and also deserve 
more studies, especially for a putative role of insects in transmis-
sion cycles in European conditions (Bonnet et al., 2020; de Carvalho 
Ferreira et al., 2014; Olesen, Hansen et al., 2018; Olesen, Lohse 
et al., 2018; Saegerman et al., 2020) (EFSA, 2010).
At the pig holdings level, the semi- quantitative assessment high-
lighted three groups in the transmission routes between holdings. 
The most important routes were animal movements (for which it 
should be reminded that the experts were clearly requested to as-
sess the transmission routes before any management measures in 
place, that is before any detection of an index case and putative first 
propagation events), the operator himself (the farmer), the practi-
tioner (veterinarian), the iatrogenic route, animal transport trucks 
and animal care equipment. Moreover, the assessment of these six 
routes was associated with a lower uncertainty compared with the 
assessment of most of the other routes, which further reinforces 
their relative importance. Animal movement networks are essential 
in understanding and containing the spread of infectious diseases 
in farming industries. Pig movement networks have been analysed 
and found to be useful in predicting the risk of infectious disease 
outbreaks (Halasa et al., 2016; Lentz et al., 2016). Similar models are 
useful and urgently needed for every country threatened by ASF in-
troduction to their pig industry in order to focus on early measures 
on high- risk holdings (‘super spreaders’). It should be stressed that 
the farmer and the veterinarian(s) on the farm are again identified 
as very important transmission routes (mechanical vectors) for ASF 
spread between holdings. This underlines their roles and respon-
sibilities in ensuring the implementation of biosecurity measures 
(Beltrán- Alcrudo et al., 2017).
The effect of live animal movements on disease spread is depen-
dent on the course of the disease. For a disease such as ASF with 
a short incubation period and quite pathognomonic clinical signs, 
the spread through animal movements before the first detection of 
the infection is expected to be minimal. During the period, ASF was 
present in the wild reservoir in Belgium additional vigilance was in-
troduced through the legal requirements to report any clinical signs 
or abnormal mortality in pigs (with routine sampling and laboratory 
analysis for ASF). This was aimed at detecting a possible index case 
in the domestic population as early as possible. Moreover also the 
biosecurity (especially external biosecurity) was increased. The com-
bination of these measures aimed at limiting possible spread of the 
virus once it was introduced into the domestic population. However, 
the experience of the previous ASF epidemic in Belgium must re-
mind that late reporting can seriously jeopardize animal health and 
the economy of the country (Biront et al., 1987). In some cases (e.g. 
large holding with separated operating units), this risk has been as-
sociated with a relatively low apparent mortality rate (due to a low 
inter- unit spreading rate of the virus, that is the virus spreading fast 
between animals within a closed unit but slower between units). This 
scenario has been observed during some ASF outbreak in Eastern 
European domestic pig holdings (Schulz et al., 2017). These factors 
can therefore delay the detection of virus circulation in the index 
holding if samples are not sent early for analysis in case of clinical 
syndrome and facilitates an initial spread via animal movements.
The limitations of this study are those related to every expert 
elicitations, in particular those carried out by mail during which fur-
ther explanation cannot be obtained, as well as to qualitative assess-
ment. Furthermore, ASF epidemiology is complex, especially when 
dealing with the interface of the domestic pig sector and wildlife. 
Finding experts who cover every field of expertise (virology, epide-
miology, pig sector, wildlife) is difficult. However the response rate, 
the diversity in the collected expertise and the performed sensitivity 
analyses on the results allow to give robust confidence in the final 
results. Interestingly, sensitivity analysis highlights the importance 
to consider all criteria (likelihood of contamination by ASF, likelihood 
of transmission of ASF to domestic pigs, and frequency of contact 
between domestic pigs) in ASF transmission routes and to use a suf-
ficient number of experts coming from different fields of expertise 
in order to produce robust scientific advice for decision- making. 
Many uncertainties remain or data need further validation (e.g. the 
role of feed or haematophagous arthropods). This study especially 
associated a level of uncertainty on each assessment made.
Results of this study demonstrate the importance of indirect 
routes, especially the human- related ones, for ASF introduction into 
a pig holding considering the Belgian context for ASF. Considering 
further ASF spread between pig holdings, animal movements and 
once again, humans as passive vectors were shown to be the most 
important transmission routes. Increasing pig owner awareness 
about biosecurity, in particular about external biosecurity, and key 
features of the disease, as well as performing regular risk- based 
surveillance by the animal health authorities in pig holdings helped 
to tackle the risk associated to ASF for the Belgian pig industry. As 
the structure of the pig sector of most of the Western European 
countries is similar to that of Belgium (few non- commercial farms 
and relatively high biosecurity level), conclusions of this study could 
be extrapolated to them.
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